Class Mobility, Return Migration, and Impact of Migrants’ Capital

Abstract

The aim of this research is threefold: to define and discuss class mobility, to study if there is a causal correlation between return migration and class mobility, and to investigate how returnees’ economic capital enhances their upward class mobility.

To do this, migration and class mobility will be thoroughly discussed to test whether or not there is a correlation between the two. On the other hand, an investigation will take place concerning return migrants who came back with economic capital in order to study to what extent their economic capital had an impact on their class mobility. The theory used in this paper is Pierre Bourdieu’s social capital theory.

Keywords: Class, Class Mobility, Return Migrants, Economic Capital, Social Capital, Bourdieusian theory

Introduction

In the 1970s and 1980s, a new explanation of migration came into account, and it was called the historical-structural theories (Castles et al., 2014). Historical-structuralists describe migration as one of the various manifestations of the capitalist penetrations, and the uneven terms of trade between underdeveloped and developed countries (Castles et al., 2014). While neoclassical theories view migration as voluntary such as the case of migration from Europe to the United States before 1914, historical-structural theories tend to concentrate on the large-scale labor recruitment such as Indian workers in Britain (Castles et al., 2014). The control and availability of labor is the result of international inequalities and war, and a legacy of colonialism (Castles et al., 2014).

Pioneers of the historical-structural theories criticized neoclassical approaches through arguing that people do not have a free will or a free choice owing to the fact they are primarily constrained by structural forces (Castles et al., 2014). Within this perspective, individuals are forced to migrate because the global political-economic system undermined the traditional economic structures (Castles et al., 2014). During these processes, people from rural areas become progressively deprived from their classical livelihoods, and these people also become a part of the urban working class to the advantage of employers in the wealthy countries and urban areas that depend on cheap labor (Castles et al., 2014).

Historical-structuralists assume in their theories that political and economic power is unevenly distributed among the poor and rich countries, that numerous groups and classes have unequal access to the resources, and that the capitalist extension has a huge tendency to reinforce the inequalities (Castles et al., 2014). In this context, historical-structuralists view migration as a way of promoting cheap labor which leads to boosting profit and depriving areas of origin from valuable skills and labor (Castles et al., 2014). In contrast to the neoclassical theory, migration is hence perceived as exploiting the resources of poor countries, deepening unequal development, and leading to increased disequilibria in order to make the rich even richer (Castles et al., 2014).

Pierre Bourdieu adopted Marx’s concept of capital, and he used it to refer to economic capital, cultural capital, and social capital. To begin with economic capital, it is the resources that are instantly convertible into money (Barasan et al., 2018; Franklin, 2003). Cultural capital is the objects such as books and paintings, qualifications such as diplomas, and acquired dispositions that prove the mastery of the linguistic, artistic and scientific codes of a given social space (Barasan et al., 2018; Franklin, 2003). The third form of capital, social capital, is the resource founded by acquaintances’ usable networks based on mutual recognition such as a family name indicating social pedigree or a membership to private societies (Barasan et al., 2018; Franklin, 2003). All the mentioned capitals grant specific powers, predominantly symbolic power (Barasan et al., 2018; Franklin, 2003). Symbolic power is the power created when an individual is socially seen in what he or she says, does or possesses (Barasan et al., 2018; Franklin, 2003). These capitals effectivity does not only prove itself in the immediate usage, but also within the mere possession’s socially-recognized meaning (Barasan et al., 2018; Franklin, 2003).

This paper focuses on migration, class mobility, and the impact of migrants’ economic capital on their class mobility. The first part of the paper is a definition of social class and class mobility, the second part consists of studying if there is a causal correlation between return migration and class mobility, and the third part is an investigation about how return migrants’ economic capital enhances their upward class mobility in the sending country. To do this, migration and class mobility will be thoroughly discussed to test whether or not there is a correlation between the two. On the other hand, an investigation will take place concerning return migrants who came back with economic capital in order to study to what extent their economic capital had an impact on their class mobility. This matter will be tackled from Pierre Bourdieu’s social capital theory. Social capital can be defined as the status and prestige enjoyed by a person, and it is socially remitted (Tabar et al., 2016). The central research questions are: Is there a causal correlation between migration and class mobility? To what extent did return migrants’ economic capital had an impact on their social class mobility? To provide a starting point of the research, I hypothesize that there is a causal correlation between migration and upward class mobility. I also hypothesize that having money from abroad may lead to enhance one’s social capital through social networks, but social capital in the case of return migrants with lots of money is not the primary cause of them joining an upper class i.e. class mobility. In fact, the economic capital they accrued from abroad may be converted to social capital which in turn may reinforce and even enhance their class mobility.

The paper will be organized as follows: a literature review which has the definition of social class and class mobility, an overview about migration, class mobility, and an investigation about how return migrants’ economic capital has an impact on their upward class mobility. After that, an analysis and a discussion will take place to examine the impact of migration and economic capital on individuals’ upward class mobility.

Literature Review

Definition of Social Class and Class Mobility

In his explanation of social class, Wright’s (2002) gradational theory is about the social class ladder which is consisted of the underclass, lower class, lower middle class, middle class, upper middle class, and upper class. Nevertheless, there are three main social classes which are the bourgeois (those who own the means of production), the proletariat (the working class), and the petit bourgeois (the middle class) (Atkinson, 2015). Social or class mobility as defined by Farooq (2012) is the movement, change, and shift in one’s social position. This change can be from one position or a place to another (Farooq, 2012). This change is value free which means it cannot be labeled as good or bad (Farooq, 2012). When we use social before mobility, it implies that individuals occupying a certain social status, move to another (Farooq, 2012). This movement in the social ladder can be upward or downward, inter-generational or intra-generational (Farooq, 2012). There are seven types of social mobility: Horizontal Mobility, Vertical Mobility, Upward Mobility, Downward Mobility, Inter-generational Mobility, Intra-generational Mobility, and Occupational Mobility (Farooq, 2012). These types of mobility are not exclusive, for they can overlap (Farooq, 2012). Upward mobility will only be discussed owing to its relevance to this paper’s topic. Upward mobility is the movement of individuals from a lower-class position to an upper-class position (Farooq, 2012). Upward class mobility has several factors some of which are motivation, achievements and failures, education, skills and training, industrialization, urbanization, legalization, politicization, modernization, and migration (Farooq, 2012).

Migration and Class Mobility

Migration, social change, and social mobility are topics that have aroused recently in the international research debate (Akerman, 1977). Migration facilitates social mobility (Farooq, 2012). People immigrate due to push or pull factors (Farooq, 2012). Not all destination countries have opportunities to improve one’s social stance, and therefore, forced migration takes place for people to earn their livelihood (Farooq, 2012). New places may have different opportunities and openings (Farooq, 2012). Migrants take advantage of these opportunities in order to improve their social positions (Farooq, 2012). Various examples were given by scholars about people who experienced upward class mobility due to migration. We can begin with people who belonged to the Scheduled Castes of Uttar Pradesh and Bihar who migrated to Haryana and Punjab in order to earn their livelihoods (Farooq, 2012). After they acquired money abroad, they returned to their villages to buy lands (Farooq, 2012). Being land owners, these migrants went from being farmers to land owners who hire farmers (Farooq, 2012). A similar situation happened to Asians who migrated to the United States and Europe (Farooq, 2012). Migration is often found to be the activating mechanism for social change and upward social mobility in individuals’ life cycle (Akerman, 1977). The connection between social progress and long-distance migration in a growing labor market is hence a crucial one (Akerman, 1977). Amid American investigations, a noteworthy amount of social mobility has been recorded between nearly defined strata in the society (Akerman, 1977). Approximately the same results were evident in three Swedish cities with an equivalent social structure (Akerman, 1977).

Another case study was made on the Greek and the British immigrants in Australia. It emphasizes on the short-run achievements and differential expectations of the aforementioned ethnic groups in the immigration program in Australia (Appleyard, 1968). In terms of proportion granted and numbers admitted financial support with their travel, the British immigrant families were obviously preferred over single Greek workers (Appleyard, 1968). This preference goes back to the similarity of language, social patterns and culture in which human-power training systems have created workers with skills that are acceptable in Australia and the United Kingdom (Appleyard, 1968). Skilled or semi-skilled British migrants who are expected to acquire similar careers with greater incomes which might enable them later to purchase homes, while minorities had dreams to become entrepreneurs (Appleyard, 1968). On the other hand, approximately all young families were seeking better opportunities for their children, and this was the primary motive behind their decision to immigrate (Appleyard, 1968). Their discourse clearly implies expectations for upward social mobility (Appleyard, 1968). Eighteen months later, follow-up interviews showed that, as expected, substantial increases in money incomes was witnessed (Appleyard, 1968).

A study on Greek workers in Australia in 1964 indicated that these workers’ achievements and expectations had been habituated by their inability to speak English and their lack of professional skills (Appleyard, 1968). The motivation behind female workers’ immigration to Australia was fleeing the poverty in Greece associated with the opportunity that Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration (ICEM) provided (Appleyard, 1968). Although the opportunities for upward social mobility are very limited in Australia, male Greek workers’ dominant expectation was land ownership, business, and/or parents’ and siblings’ sponsorship from Greece (Appleyard, 1968). Twelve months later, follow-up interviews with the same individuals showed that various male workers had saved large amounts of money (Appleyard, 1968). They intended to invest them in business/land, or to take them back to Greece in case they do not want to settle in Australia (Appleyard, 1968). The resettlement process was very difficult for female workers (Appleyard, 1968). Although they instantly secured unskilled jobs and managed to increase their salaries by more than a factor of six, in the social life, they were in a “limbo land” amidst the Australian and Greek communities (Appleyard, 1968). Therefore, it is not surprising that most of their efforts were directed toward nominating relatives from Greece (Appleyard, 1968). The Australian studies stress that the aspirations and motives vary considerably among ethnic groups (Appleyard, 1968). Language, occupational skills, and culture affect the rapidity and nature of social mobility (Appleyard, 1968).

Aside from long-distance migration, internal migration is another factor for upward class mobility. An example was given by Asad (2015) about migrants who fled Hurricane Katrina that happened in New Orleans during summer 2005 to settle elsewhere in the United States. Although Penelope, a mother of two, fled the natural disaster as a form of forced migration to the suburbs of Houston, she later figured out that Houston offered more opportunities for upward social mobility than New Orleans did (Asad, 2015). Penelope’s husband found a job position in Houston similar to that he had in New Orleans with a better salary, and in terms of schooling and the neighborhood they resided in, Houston was much safer for her children (Asad, 2015). Tania, another migrant from New Orleans and a mother of five, also mentioned that Houston offered more opportunities for upward social mobility, and a better living for her children (Asad, 2015). Other scholars such as Pascucci (2011), Wydick (2007), Harrison (1998), and Fielding (1995) also discussed the cases of internal migrants whose migration resulted in their upward class mobility.

Migration and upward class mobility have a strong correlation. Scholarly literature, besides the aforementioned ones, gave endless examples about individuals and families who moved to an upward social class primarily because of migration, both internally and externally. Reproductive and productive resources are transferred by the transnational domestic groups’ members with an intention to improve families’ and individuals’ social positions (Oso et al., 2017; Dribe et al., 2017; Alcantara et al., 2014; Taylor, 2013; Rodriguez et al., 2012; Das-Munshi et al., 2011; Rye, 2011; Fielding, 2006; Platt, 2005; Fielding, 1997). This leads to class mobility projects, strategies, and itineraries that are progressively being readjusted and renegotiated within the transnational space (Oso et al., 2017; Dribe et al., 2017; Alcantara et al., 2014; Taylor, 2013; Rodriguez et al., 2012; Das-Munshi et al., 2011; Rye, 2011; Fielding, 2006; Platt, 2005; Fielding, 1997). It is crucial to theorize these strategies as a dynamic and highly complex process that involves the domestic group’s members, as well as embracing a transnational perspective that paves the way for their consideration past the host community (Oso et al., 2017; Dribe et al., 2017; Alcantara et al., 2014; Taylor, 2013; Rodriguez et al., 2012; Das-Munshi et al., 2011; Rye, 2011; Fielding, 2006; Platt, 2005; Fielding, 1997).

Impact of Migrants’ Economic Capital on Class Mobility

Return migrants are able to convert their economic capital into social capital, and even political capital, but that is only because they accumulated a lot of economic capital abroad. It was proven that there is a causal correlation between migration and upward class mobility, but the impact of economic capital on one’s social mobility is not covered yet. This section will examine the impact of returnees’ economic capital their upward class mobility.

When Bourdieu (1986) presented the concept of capital, his work was not only limited to the conceptual approach of various forms of capital, it was also about the theoretical analysis within the interchangeability among cultural, economic, and social capital (Yuksek, 2018). Bourdieu clearly stated in 1986 that “the convertibility of the different types of capital is the basis of the strategies aimed at ensuring the reproduction of capital (and the position occupied in social space) by means of the conversions least costly in terms of the conversion work and of the losses inherent in the conversion itself.” This means that throughout the process of the conversion of capital, people may be able to preserve their central positions in the society (Yuksek, 2018). Although individuals are capable to directly acquire resources, whether cultural, economic, or social, they are also capable to indirectly intensify their resources amid other forms of resources’ utilization (Yuksek, 2018).

Bourdieu views economic capital as the most powerful form of capital, for it remains the absolute goal for individuals (Yuksek, 2018). He discussed his concept about the conversion of capital within an individual, but he did not provide an analysis about conversion of capital among several individuals (Yuksek, 2018). Although individuals accrue economic capital to guarantee their class positions’ reproduction, they are also able to convert it into other forms of capital i.e. social and cultural in order to maintain their social positions (Yuksek, 2018). According to Bourdieu, the conversion of economic capital into social and cultural capital occurs both at a certain cost and with a potential loss out of attrition (Yuksek, 2018).

The potential loss throughout the process of conversion takes place depending on the transmissibility, liquidity, and reproducibility of the various form of capital (Yuksek, 2018). As Anheier et al. (1995) argue, economic capital is the most readily available and the most liquid form of capital when it comes to its transformation into cultural and social capital (Yuksek, 2018). As mentioned previously, the conversion of economic capital into social and cultural capital is costly, thus, many perceive this conversion as unnecessary or as a waste of time and money (Yuksek, 2018). However, Bourdieu says that this conversion is crucial because, on the long run, it enhances one’s social stance (Yuksek, 2018).

As already stated, different forms of capital can shape one’s class position, and capital can be transmitted, acquired, and converted (Van Hear, 2014). The conversion of capital can be practically applied to the migration field (Van Hear, 2014). It is now known that migration is not for the poor, instead those who have better resources are more engaged (Van Hear, 2014). Hence, international migration requires the possession or accumulation of amounts social, cultural, economic and other forms of capital (Van Hear, 2014). For some countries, a certain amount of economic capital is enough, while for others, there might be some requirements for social or cultural capital (Van Hear, 2014). Returnees who multiplied their economic capital abroad in turn achieved an upward class mobility in their country of origin (Van Hear, 2014). This is a form of conversion of migrants’ capital (Van Hear, 2014).

To clarify the aforementioned points, three case studies about Costa Ricans, Nepalese, and Surinamese will be discussed. To begin with the Costa Rican case, 218 interviews were conducted with individuals who internally migrated to Pejibaye (Sewastynowicz, 1986). Up to 72% of the interviewees worked in agriculture before moving to Pejibaye, while the rest were merchants, government employees, and unskilled and skilled laborers (Sewastynowicz, 1986). After migrating to Pejibaye, more than half of the interviewees had jobs similar to the ones they had in the city of origin but with better incomes, and they ended up with an upward class mobility (Sewastynowicz, 1986). Moreover, 36% of those who experienced upward mobility due to migration enhanced their fortunes after they invested their money in various types of businesses (Sewastynowicz, 1986). The Nepalese case is similar to the Costa Rican one, however, the two cases experienced different types of migration. Nepalese who externally migrated to India experienced both better incomes and living (Shrestha, 1993). Although those who moved to India during the first wave of migration were the only ones who experienced upward class mobility, but like the Costa Ricans, they were able to enhance their social mobility in their country of origin through investing the economic capital they accumulated abroad in business (Shrestha, 1993).

Unlike the Costa Rican and the Nepalese cases, the Surinamese people underwent forced migration to the Netherlands. While the immigration from Surinam to the Netherlands started during the colonial times, the immigration started to increase post the World War II, and it reached its peak in the 1970s (Niekerk, 2004). Over 50,000 Surinamese fled their country in 1975 seeking shelter from ethnic strife and searching for economic security (Niekerk, 2004). Most of the early Surinamese immigrants who arrived to the Netherlands had largely been from the middle class (Niekerk, 2004). However, from the 1970s on, more immigrants from the lower-class began to arrive; they were not as familiar with the Dutch culture and language as earlier immigrants were (Niekerk, 2004). Surveys conducted with the Surinamese immigrants about their socioeconomic positions two decades after their immigration to the Netherlands (Niekerk, 2004). The results show that the Surinamese were employed at better job levels with better incomes after they received higher educational levels (Niekerk, 2004). Therefore, those who belonged to the middle class made it to the upper class, and those who belonged to the lower class made it to the middle class (Niekerk, 2004). The question here is, how did the economic capital of the Surinamese enhanced their social stance? Because of the higher education they received, the Surinamese had an idea about how to successfully invest their economic capital in order to enhance or even improve their social positions. They started their own multinational corporations in Surinam, the Netherlands, and the United States (Niekerk, 2004). This in particular paved the way for the Surinamese immigrants to maintain the upward class mobility caused by migration (Niekerk, 2004).

The cases of the Costa Ricans, Nepalese, and Surinamese show how individuals’ economic capital causes upward class mobility, and in turn, it becomes converted into social capital. In this sense, we can see that return migrants’ economic capital has an impact on their upward class mobility, and therefore, on their social capital.

Methodology

The method used in this paper is a literature review with an analysis and discussion of secondary data. A discussion and an analysis will take place to answer the research questions, and to prove whether or not the hypotheses are right, or if there are further information found in the previous research studies. Additionally, an analysis about how returnees’ economic capital enhances their upward social mobility.

Discussion and Analysis

People immigrate due to push-pull factors, and one of them is social class mobility. Although not all countries of reception have opportunities to improve one’s social position, new places still have different opportunities and openings, and migrants take advantage of them. The cases mentioned about migrants who moved up the social ladder are great examples about the correlation between migration and upward mobility. They show that migration is a strong factor for individuals to undergo an upward social mobility. To begin with the case of Sweden, the Swedish immigrants left their country for the purpose of upward class mobility, and so did the Americans. However, in other cases such cases of the Nepalese, Costa Ricans, and Surinamese, it happened by chance. They fled their country due to forced migration, and because of the better opportunities they found abroad, they were able to go up the social ladder. This shows that the hypothesis provided at the beginning of the paper is correct.

Now that it is evident that migration is a factor for upward class mobility, we can move to the question of how return migrants’ economic capital helps them enhance their social position in their country of origin. In the cases provided above, the Nepalese, Costa Ricans, and Surinamese were able to invest their economic capitals in their homeland which in turn helped them enhance their social positions. After the Nepalese, Costa Ricans, and Surinamese accrued economic capital due to their migration, after they returned, they invested their money in lands, businesses, and multinational corporations. To illustrate, some of these return migrants bought lands when they returned which made them move from being farmers to land owners who hire farmers. While others tended to start businesses depending on the amount of capital they accumulated. Those with limited or small amounts of economic capital established small businesses i.e. carpentry workshop, blacksmith workshop, etc… which made them become petite bourgeois or middle class members after they belonged to the lower class. On the other hand, those with better or more economic capital started larger-scale businesses i.e. factories, schools, etc… which made them join the upper class. In both cases, return migrants’ economic capital was the reason they were able to enhance their upward class mobility in their countries of origin. Additionally, some of those who established larger-scale business were able to start multinational corporations. Most of them started these corporations in the country of reception, then they moved their businesses to their homelands and elsewhere.

Although it might seem that return migrants’ upward social mobility is a positive aspect of migration, however, the social inequality in the country of origin migration causes is important to discuss. Return migrants’ economic capital and their upward class mobility causes social inequality, and in turn, it leaves a huge gap among classes. This was the main issue in the Marxist historical structural theories.

A wide range of approaches highlight the effect of cross-border migration on social inequalities (Faist, 2016). To point out some, historical economic literature suggests that transatlantic migration in the 19th century was practiced as a form of safety valve for sending countries across Europe, and it also served as a welcome labor supply for colonies which was a win-win situation (Faist, 2016). Economic approaches stressed on the equalization of the production factors between immigration and emigration countries produced by cross-border migration (Faist, 2016). The transitional viewpoint has raised questions regarding the groups who benefit the most from cross-border remittances and has argued the possible disparate social stances of migrants in both emigration and immigration countries (Faist, 2016). The issue is related to the outcomes of potential poverty reduction, reverse financial remittances, and brain drain discussed in empirical studies (Faist, 2016). Concerning the countries of emigration, politico-sociologist approaches have handled social remittances’ impact on gender equality and democratization, as well as the trade-off among rights versus numbers (Faist, 2016). While regarding the countries of immigration, approaches as such have addressed the closure’s liberal paradox versus the openness of borders, and the culture’s sociology has emphasized the language’s performative role amid the group categorizations’ processes (Faist, 2016). In the sociology of culture and political sociology, the available concepts have contributed in moving the questions about mechanisms accounting for the production and reproduction of inequalities (Faist, 2016).

Conclusion

The aim of this research is to prove there is a correlation between migration and upward class mobility, and to discuss the impact of return migrants’ economic capital on their class positions. Literature shows that there is a very strong correlation between migration and upward class mobility. Return migrants who accrued economic capital abroad went up the social ladder, and they invested their economic capital in order to preserve their social stance. However, a keynote is that the economic capital they accumulated because of migration, and which was the reason behind their upward class mobility, resulted in creating a huge gap among social classes in the country of origin, and in turn, it caused social inequality.

The examples given in the cases of Sweden, the United States, Nepal, Costa Rica, and Suriname prove that migration if one of the factors of social inequality in the countries of origin. As the historical-structural theories put it, migration is perceived as exploiting the resources of poor countries, deepening unequal development, and leading to increased disequilibria in order to make the rich even richer.

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